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I Introduction
At the end of the twentieth century Africa will be
remembered for two historic events: the rise of the
popular movement that led to the downfall of
apartheid in South Africa, and the human catastro-
phe involving the massacre of more than a million
people in Rwanda. If the one was achieved through
the mobilisation of the majority for a democratic
alternative for social development, the other was
fuelled by pressures to comply with an externally
defined agenda for social development designed to
open its markets for the needs of capital.
These events represent the extremes of hope and
despair that have come to characterise much of the
continent in recent years. Every country in the
region contains the mixture of factors that can lead
to either outcome - a future built on respect for
human dignity or one torn apart by conflicts. Such
outcomes will be determined by a number of fac-
tors, not least of which will be the nature and
implementation of social policies.
But in the era of 'globalisation', the capacity of
African countries to determine the goals and con-
tent of social policy has been radically constrained.
Internationally globalisation has meant that the
rich have got richer, the poor poorer. While the
average income of the top 20 per cent of the world's
population was 30 times that of the bottom 20 per
cent in 1960, by 1990 it was 60 times, and by
1997, 74 times that of the lowest fifth. By the late
1990s, 20 per cent of the world's population had
86 per cent of world GDP, while the bottom 20 per
cent had 1 per cent. Nearly one quarter of the
worl&s people have an income that is less than $1
a day - a proportion that is rising.
In this article, I argue that the majority of people in
Africa appear to have less control over their destiny
and the goals of social development than they had
at independence - arguably, less control than ever.
Through international financial institutions and
development agencies, the advanced capitalist
world is increasingly defining the agenda for social
and economic development in Africa. This has had
disastrous effects on Africa's poor. To understand
how this has come about one must trace the emer-
gence of social policy in the region from colonial
times to the present.
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2 Social Policy in the Age of the
'Social Contract'
Colonial government social services for Africans
were minimal. Social policy was geared towards
ensuring the integrity of the structures of colonial
rule and a reasonably efficient exploitation of the
colony The goals of social development (such as
they were) were defined in the metropolis. Social
services were not, however, completely absent.
Health services were provided during serious epi-
demics, principally to prevent infections spreading
into white society Limited education was provided
when certain basic skills were deemed necessary for
the administration or exploitation of the colony
Charities and missionary groups (the precursors of
modern NGOs) exchanged their spiritual wares for
social services. Implementation of social policy was
'decentralised' to Native Authorities whose function
was to maintain social control in the rural reserves.
Although on the eve of independence there were to
be significant changes in the extent to which invest-
ments were to be made in the social sectors, for the
most part the state's function in these sectors was to
provide only for a minority.1
The situation changed dramatically at indepen-
dence. One of the most remarkable, yet least
acknowledged, achievements of independence gov-
ernments was that, within a few years, access to
health services and education became effectively
universal. lt is a tribute to the capacity of the state
to implement such far-reaching social programmes,
even though the quality of services had many short-
comings. The impact was reflected in dramatic
improvements in life expectancy, mortality rates,
nutritional status, literacy and education by the end
of the 1970s. Aggregate figures for sub-Saharan
Africa show that life expectancy increased from 38
years in 1960 to 47 years in 1978, despite the fact
that GNP per capita increased only modestly from
$222 to $280 (World Bank 1981). These achieve-
ments challenge the current, largely ideologically
motivated, caricature of the state as 'inefficient' and
unable to deliver effective services.2
There were two major reasons for the substantial
social investments made by independence govern-
ments. First, the credibility and legitimacy of
nationalist independence movements was based on
the 'social contract' - the promise to end the social
injustices of the colonial era. The post-war era of
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popular mobilisation was initially informed less by
abstract concepts of self-determination, than by
struggles for basic everyday rights. The spark for
most people was the need to organise around basic
rights to food and shelter, and basic freedoms of
association, speech and movement.3 Political inde-
pendence was achieved through nationalist leader-
ships capturing the imagination of these
movements, uniting them in the promise that only
through self-determination and independence
could their aspirations be achieved.
Second, donors' were favourably disposed towards
such a project. If the former colonies were to be
integrated into the new world economy then a form
of structural adjustment - or 'modernisation' - was
required. The road to 'development' was seen as
state investment in the social sectors, while creating
an enabling environment for the private sector.4
Public opinion in advanced capitalist countries was
also favourable to the new foreign policy of making
good some of the ills of the past.
The critical point here is that social policy was
determined, or at least strongly influenced, by the
mass movement. It was designed to meet needs that
were defined by that movement, and which people
believed they had a right to expect their govern-
ment to provide, Insofar as those who now con-
trolled the state were bound by the (albeit
unwritten and informal) social contract, some
degree of accountability could be said to exist
between the government and the people. But that
degree of accountability was not, in most cases, to
persist.
3 Social Policy and the
Depoliticisation of Poverty
Once in power, the nationalist leadership saw its
task as one of preventing 'centrifugal forces' from
competing for political power or seeking greater
autonomy from the newly formed 'nation'. The state
defined for itself an interventionist role in 'mod-
ernisation' and a centralising and controlling role in
the political realm. Social pluralism began to be
frowned upon. The popular associations that had
thrown the nationalist leadership into power grad-
ually began to be seen as an obstacle to the new god
of 'development'. No longer was there a need, it was
argued, for popular participation: the new
governments would bring development to the peo-
ple. Social and economic improvements would
come with patience and as a result of combined
national effort involving all classes (harambee, in
Kenyatta's famous slogan). In this early period after
independence, civil and political rights came to be
seen as a luxury, to be enjoyed in the future when
'development' had been achieved. For the present,
said many African presidents, 'our people are not
ready' - mirroring, ironically, the same arguments
used by the former colonial rulers against national-
ists a few years earlier.
At the same time as the social infrastructure was
being built with the financial support of 'aid agen-
cies', a transformation led to a demobilisation of the
popular movement that had given rise to indepen-
dence. Popular organisations that had emerged out
of the struggle for rights were discouraged from
having a role in the process. Rights were now codi-
fied and rarefied in laws whose relevance was deter-
mined by the self-proclaimed, and increasingly
unaccountable, guardians of the state. Concerns
about rights and justice were gradually replaced by
concerns about 'development'. The 'problem' was
no longer, it appeared, the denial of basic rights, but
one of 'poverty'. While the one demanded action to
prevent violations, the other inspired only pity and
preoccupations about the technically 'correct'
approaches to 'poverty alleviation'.
Certainly there were major problems faced by the
newly independent states in addressing how the
forces of production (whether industrial or agri-
cultural) could be developed to drag Africa out of
the destitution created by colonial rule. But the
discourse was not about development in the sense
of developing productive forces.5 Nor was it one
that recognised that poverty was the result of a
denial of basic rights. Instead, it was about
advancing the capacity of the new ruling class to
accumulate and of international capital to con-
tinue its exploitation.
The structures of accountability and democracy
inherent to rights' movements were replaced by
bureaucratic and centralised decision-making
under the guise of 'national planning'. Political
associations were discouraged, if not actually
banned, while trade unions were constrained,
incorporated into the structures of the ruling party,
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or simply disbanded. The political hegemony of the
new post-independence rulers had been asserted.
Those in control of the state and its organs discov-
ered that the state machinery was a significant
source of wealth. Some, like Nverere, sought to
control the use of the state as a source of accumula-
tion. But in other countries, access to the state
became an end in itself amongst the elite. Favour,
patronage, and corruption increasingly came to be
seen as a means for limiting competition to the state
itself. In many cases, the most cohesive force able to
compete was the armed forces. Certainly in West
and Central Africa, coups d'riat became (and sadly
remain) commonplace.
But the 'misuse' of the state was to become a critical
factor in the transformations brought to the devel-
opment agenda. Development programmes were
brought not to where there was the greatest social
or economic need, but to where investment would
favour particular social or 'ethnic groups whose
political alliance was deemed useful at a particular
time, and where possibilities for accumulation by
the elite were greatest.
Under such conditions, it was hardly surprising that
competition for access to resources increasingly
manifested itself along 'ethnic' lines. With the
demise of organisations based on the struggle for
rights, old social alliances based on perceived his-
torical grievances against other 'ethnic' groups re-
emerged. The seeds of subsequent conflicts were
already taking root. Social policy began to be artic-
ulated and implemented by a class that assumed
that national interests were indistinguishable from
its own. Popular involvement in decision-making
was deemed unnecessary Central to the paradigm
of modernisation was the casting of 'poverty', rather
than rights and freedom, as the main problem fac-
ing developing countries. Where poverty was once
seen as the product of a denial of basic social and
economic rights, it now became 'the problem'.
Social policy in this period was developed centrally
and paternalistically Since the solution to poverty
was considered technical, it was to the 'develop-
ment expert' that the state turned. These came from
the North, paid for by and accountable to 'donor'
agencies and justified by the lack of local capacity.
Social development was to be carried out through
'projects'. The effect was to demobilise popular par-
ticipation and depoliticise the purpose of social
development.
By uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a
technical problem, and by promising technical
solutions to the sufferings of powerless and
oppressed people, the hegemonic problematic
of 'development' [was] the principal means
through which the question of poverty [was]
de-politicized ... At the same time, by making
the intentional blue-prints of 'development' so
highly visible, a 'development' project can end
up performing extremely sensitive political
operations involving the entrenchment and
expansion of institutional state power almost
invisibly, under cover of a neutral, technical
mission to which no-one can object. (Ferguson
1997: 256).
Social policy itself was also increasingly influenced,
if not actually determined, by donor agencies.
While the state ultimately held the power of
approval, projects were determined largely by funds
- the granting of which remained in the grace of the
donors.
As the state became less accountable to its social
base, and as decision-making became more cen-
tralised and exercised more despotically, so the
influence of representatives of northern govern-
ments grew It was not just their influence that grew,
but - in the absence of any challenge - their legiti-
macy to influence and determine social policy in
Africa. While that influence may have been exer-
cised gingerly to begin with, all coyness was to be
dispensed with in the subsequent era of structural
adjustment
4 Social Policy under Structural
Adjustment
The economic crisis that emerged out of the oil cri-
sis was characterised by a glut of capital in Europe
and America. Although many African countries
already had heavy debts, there is little doubt that
this surfeit of capital encouraged increases in the
debt burden of developing countries (Payer 1989).
Although the absolute size of debt of sub-Saharan
African countries was relatively small in propor-
tion to the external indebtedness of developing
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countries, the size of the debt in relation to the
resources and productive capacity of these African
countries was large.
The glut was short-lived. The technological revolu-
tion in microcomputers and gene technology meant
that capital moved to these profitable areas and the
1980s saw significant increases in the cost of bor-
rowing (Sivanandan 1982). Interest rates rose, and
debtor countries were suddenly faced with servic-
ing the interest on loans that absorbed ever-greater
proportions of export earnings. Debt had become
the central issue of concern in development circles.
The Bretton Woods institutions that in the post-war
period had invested so heavily to ensure the resus-
citation of economies of Europe, became the new
commanders of Third World economies. A clutch of
social and economic policies that came to be known
as structural adjustment programmes were applied,
in the spirit of universality, across the board. The
social and political impact of these policies was to
position the multilateral lending agencies (with the
support of the bilateral aid agencies) where they
could determine both the goals of development and
the means for achieving them. They legitimised
direct intervention in political decision-making
processes. They determined the extent of state
involvement in the social sector, and insisted on
draconian economic and social measures that
resulted in a rise in unemployment and the decline
in real incomes of the majority (Campbell 1989).
The result was to transform the social basis of power
in African countries, strengthening those forces that
would be sympathetic to the continued hegemony of
the multilaterals and multinational corporations.
Whereas in the earlier period northern agencies
assumed legitimacy for influencing economic policy
without too great an interference in social policy,
the era of structural adjustment blew away any sem-
blance of separation between economic and social
realms. Divisions between those who for political or
reasons of patronage received benefits, and those
who did not, were exacerbated. The old, discredited
theories of 'trickle-down' were embraced as the only
legitimate way of enjoying the fruits of development.
Popular dissatisfaction with the policies of the gov-
ernment in the 1980s led to spontaneous demon-
strations, burning of crops, wildcat strikes, and
similar expressions of discontent. Universities were
closed, demonstrations brutally suppressed, strikes
declared illegal. Trade unions, student organisa-
tions, popular organisations, and political parties
became the target of repressive legislation or
actions.
Widespread opposition resulted in some rethinking
by official aid agencies and multilaterals about how
to present the same economic and social pro-
grammes with a more 'human face'.6 Funds were
allocated to 'mitigating' the 'social dimensions of
adjustment'. Such programmes acted as palliatives
to minimise the more glaring inequalities that their
policies had perpetuated. Funds were made avail-
able to ensure that social services for the 'vulnera-
ble' would be provided - but this time not by the
state (which had after all been forced to 'retrench')
but by the ever willing NGO sector.
The availability of such funds for the NGO sector
was to have a profound impact on the very nature
of that sector. The pressure on NGOs was to
encourage them to become service providers
instead of social activists, filling in the space created
by the retrenching state. The rationale was that
NGOs are supposedly closer to the people, more
efficient and more cost effective than the state. The
fact that NGOs are in practice no more accountable
to the population than private companies provided
added leverage for northern agencies to influence
social policy Without alternative or independent
sources of income, the NGO sectofs vulnerability
was exploited to serve the interests of outside agen-
cies who have increasingly been able to define the
agenda for social development.
Although during the 1990s there had been an
overall reduction in aid from Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries, the proportions directed
through NGOs increased substantially (INTRAC
1998). NGOs were perceived as a powerful mech-
anism by which northern governments could
bypass the state not only to exert direct influence
on social policy but also to act as a means of polit-
ical intervention. At the 1995 Social Summit, for
example, the US Vice-President stated that the
US Government 'would seek to channel up to 40
per cent of its assistance to poor countries
through private aid and charity groups that have
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demonstrated greater efficiency than many inter-
national organisations including the United
Nations'. The political role of USAID was publicly
criticised by Nelson Mandela in his address to the
nation in December 1997. Citing a report of
USAID consultants:
Two thirds of [US1AID funding ... is used to
fund AID-dependent NGOs ... The old 'strug-
gle NGOs' have been redesignated by AID as
'civil service organisations' (or CSOs). AID now
funds CSOs to 'monitor public policy, provide
information, and advocate policy alternatives'
and to serve as 'sentinels, brokers, and arbiters
for the public will.' The purpose of AID'S fund-
ing is to enable these CSOs to 'function as effec-
tive policy advocacy groups' and 'to lobby'
Through its NGOs, AID intends to play a key
role in domestic policy concernïng the most
difficult, controversial issues of national poli-
tics. AID'S political agenda is ambitious and
extensive.
By insisting that the state redirect its investments
away from the social sector in favour of the private,
the way was laid open for blatant direction of social
policy using aid and 'counterpart' funds. The right
of the state to define, determine and influence social
policy was effectively challenged, creating cönsider-
able tensions between the state and NGOs. The fact
that those who controlled the state had already lost
legitimacy due to despotism and patronage meant
that few were in a position to defend this negation
of the role of the state.
5 Pluralism, Primitive
Accumulation and Conflict
The late 1980s witnessed the re-emergence of the
mass movement in South Africa. The South African
economy was paralysed, as were its political institu-
tions. All eyes turned south: everyone expected an
explosion, a social revolution that would shake the
continent. Legitimisation of political opposition and
deracialisation of civil society in South Africa was
the cry of the international community the only
way to prevent the threat of social upheavals. But if
political opposition and the freedoms of civil soci-
ety were to be legitimised in one part of Africa, why
not elsewhere?
Furthermore, with the collapse of the Berlin Wall,
the credibility of alternative ideologies to
Thatcherite capitalism also collapsed. Opposition
was no longer a function of alternative ideas or poli-
cies or about who could enhance development, but
now an open and frank fight in the market place for
economic hegemony
In the 1990s, the focus of attention of the interna-
tional community was on persuading African gov-
ernments to permit political pluralism in the form
of 'multipartyism'. Democratisation of the struc-
tures of the state had not occurred, and was cer-
tainly no longer in the interest of the ruling elites.
The state's role in the social sector had been effec-
tively gelded in the process of structural adjust-
ment, and its decisive role in determining economic
policy had been appropriated by the multilateral
institutions. What was left that could stave off social
upheaval? Pluralism in the political arena seemed
the only possibility
Ten years ago many expected that the situation in
Africa would be improved as one-party states gave
way to multi-party systems and elected govern-
ments. The much vaunted 'African Renaissance' has
been associated, instead, with declining economic
performance, an externally imposed structural
adjustment, backsliding on democratic and other
human rights reforms, and increased national and
regional tensions, Civil war in the Great Lakes
Region has drawn into its vortex countries as far
afield as Chad, Namibia and Zimbabwe, as well as
countries in the immediate peripheries on the
Lakes. Other conflicts have threatened Angola,
Sierra Leone, Sudan, Somalia, Liberia, Eritrea,
Ethiopia and Lesotho. Conflicts have led to desta-
bilisation of populations and massive flows of
refugees between and within countries, with
women and children the most affected.
Despite progress in countries such as South Africa,
stagnating economies and growing disparities
between rich and poor threaten to destabilise or
erode the gains that have been made.
Disenchantment and social unrest frequently lead
to volatile political environments. Even in South
Africa, with the largest economy in Africa, more
than 30 per cent of its 40 million people are
unemployed, many living in extreme poverty as a
legacy of apartheid. The country's economy poses
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substantial threats to the sustainability of democra-
tic and social reforms. Elsewhere, as in Zimbabwe,
a retreat from democratic and human rights reforms
and tolerance for 'civil society' has also been threat-
ened in the face of economic reforms.
The collapse of ideology associated with the col-
lapse of the Berlin \Vall led to the legitimisation of
ruthless competition that, in the absence of legiti-
mate mechanisms for constraint, was increasingly
conducted by the most ruthless means. The distinc-
tion between social organisation for criminal activi-
ties and for political purposes became blurred.
Civilians became increasingly caught in the crossfire
as the targets of armed opposition groups or of the
increasingly desperate state machinery
Despite moves towards democratisation in a num-
ber of states, fraud, procedural irregularities,
harassment of political opponents, torture, prison
and other extra-judicial killings remain the means
by which control is exerted over the state. While in
some cases killings have been committed against a
background of civil war, where members of partic-
ular communities or 'ethnic groups' are regarded as
legitimate targets, in other cases state-supported
killings have been presented as outcomes merely of
'ethnic clashes'. Far from legitimising any struggle
for basic rights or for greater accountability of the
state, the result has been to bring into the public
domain the seething divisions between sections of
the ruling class competing for control of the state.
With their usually rural constituencies, this brought
the explosive tensions of tribalism into the urban
context.7
The material basis for conflicts in Africa had been
laid. Popular movements that had once organised
around struggles for rights and justice had been
demobilised, either through repression, or by redi-
recting attention to the apparently neutral territory
of 'development'. The process of democratisation of
the colonial state had been limited to deracialisation
of urban civil society, while the rural peasantry
remained constricted within the structures of
Native Authorities established under colonialism.
The development process itself had become a
source of accumulation and patronage. Structural
adjustment programmes exacerbated social differ-
entiation. As the pie got smaller, so the state became
more repressive. Religious and quasi-religious
organisations, sects and other such movements
emerged, as they had in the 1920s, as the source of
social solidarity. In the urban centres, the only tol-
erated form of organisation became the network of
criminal organisation that rooted themselves in
pen-urban ghettos.
The state in contemporary Africa inherited many of
the features of its colonial predecessor. The repres-
sive nature of colonial legislation, the judiciary and
the coercive machinery of the state are well docu-
mented. Colonial governance was authoritarian and
racist. Its strategy was to divide and rule, accompa-
nied by uneven development. At its heart was the
creation of a system of 'decentralised despotism,' to
use Mamdani's (1996) characterisation: the use of
Native Authorities to define and enforce custom
with the backing of armed forces, to control, govern
and exploit the rural peasantry
Although state control changed hands at indepen-
dence, the structures of state machinery were rarely
radically transformed. The political programme car-
ried out in most countries was to deracialise the
state and the public domain. This opened up new
opportunities for the ascendant middle classes to
accumulate, creating the basis upon which favour
and corruption would flourish, changing urban life
and civil society The ethnically defined Native
Authorities, which exercised control and hegemony
in the rural areas through unelected chieftainships
before independence, were largely left intact.
The deracialisation of urban life without a concur-
rent detnbalisation of rural authority was to become
the 'critical dichotomy of post-colonial political
economy', and source of major conflicts. For
Without a reform in the local state, the peas-
antry locked up under the hold of a multiplic-
ity of ethnically defined Native Authorities
could not be brought into the mainstream of the
historical process. In the absence of democrati-
zation, development became a top-down
agenda enforced on the peasantry. Without
thoroughgoing democratization, there would be
no development of the home market. The latter
failure opened wide what was a crevice at inde-
pendence. With every downturn in the interna-
tional economy the crevice turned into an
opportunity for an externally defined structural
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adjustment that combined a narrowly defined
program of privatization with a broadly defined
program of globalisation. The result was both
an internal privatization that recalled the racial
imbalance that was civil society in the colonial
period and an externally managed capital
inflow that towed alongside a phalanx of expa-
triates - according to the UN estimates, more
now than in the colonial period (Mamdani
1996: 288).
The underlying causes of the 1994 Rwandan con-
flict offer a tragic example of the consequences of
externally driven social and economic agenda exac-
erbating internal contradictions. The collapse of the
International Coffee Agreement had a devastating
effect on more than 70 per cent of households in
the country, and farmers expressed their anger and
frustration by cutting down 3,000 coffee trees in
1992. This exacerbated tensions fuelled by the
attempted invasion of the Rwandese Patriotic Front
(RPF). The government understood that its legiti-
macy was being challenged. lt became more repres-
sive, disseminating hate propaganda against the
supposed 'enemy', the Tutsi, and encouraging sys-
tematic killings and violations against anyone
defined as Tutsi or Tutsi allies. The defence compo-
nent of the government's already over-stretched
budget increased substantially with the army
expanding from 5,000 to over 40,000 soldiers. In
this context the World Bank insisted on the imple-
mentation of its standard package of social and eco-
nomic policies - reducing public expenditure,
privatisation, retrenchment, and making people pay
more for health and education. This increased the
burden on the majority of Rwandese, 85 per cent of
whom were living below the poverty line. The con-
flict was triggered within the context of disintegrat-
ing political institutions and the political impasse
over the proposed power sharing with the RPF
when the presidential plane was shot down in April
1994 (Sane and Manji 1997).
If the development process had become about who
gets access to what, then civil war is but a more
destructive continuation of that process.8 Civil war
appears to have become the inexorable outcome of
the development process itself. In Sierra Leone and
Liberia, war has been lucrative for illegal mining,
drug trafficking and money laundering. Angola's
protracted war has helped Savimbi and some multi-
national corporations to extract diamonds from the
country: in 1993 alone, Savimbi's rebel group pock-
eted $250 million De Beers has admitted to buying
diamonds illegally mined in Angola worth $500
million In 1992 alone, money laundered from
drugs in war-torn countries amounted to about
$856 million The war in the Democratic Republic
of Congo has become a fight for control over the
rich mineral wealth of the country in which a range
of multinational corporations have been implicated
(Global Witness 1998).
6 Globalisation and Loss of Self-
determination
Structural adjustment effectively dismantled the
public sector, bringing in deregulation, privatisation
and 'liberalisation'. The preoccupation of interna-
tional financial institutions and aid agencies with
structural adjustment was driven, many believe, by
the ideology of the New Right. But its purpose was
far-sighted - to restructure the world economy and
the underlying social relations of production for the
needs of the latest phase of capitalist globalisation,
itself the product of revolutions in information
communications and gene technology (Sivanandan
1999). Just as the industrial revolution had led to
the need to colonise the world, so the new techno-
logical revolution has created its own restructured
world economy. Although the effects of structural
adjustment were to be most devastating in the Third
World, structural adjustment has not been confined
to the 'peripheries': Thatcherism and Reaganism
were domestic articulations of the same process,
and the effects of the process in Canada have paral-
lels with those implemented in Africa (Pulkingham
and Ternowetsky 1998).
Globalisation has been driven by market expan-
sion, forcing open national borders to trade, cap-
ital and information. The principal channels for
the transmission of these changes were the
Bretton Woods institutions and the Uruguay
Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) that gave birth to the World Trade
Organisation (WTO). The trade negotiations at
Uruguay extended the concept of trade to new
areas including services, trade-related invest-
ments and intellectual property rights. These
'multilateral agreements' have been backed by
strong enforcement mechanisms that are not only
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binding on national governments but drastically
reduce their scope for making policy. New agree-
ments such as the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) will enable
multinational corporations to dominate the global
market even more easily
It is widely acknowledged that the result has been
to increase the gap between rich and poor coun-
tries, and between rich and poor within each
country Globalisation has created new threats to
personal, economic, cultural and political secu-
rity The structures and processes of global policy-
making are dominated by key institutions
(International Monetary Fund (IMF), World
Bank, G-7, G-10, G-22, OECD, WTO) dominated
by the governments of advanced capitalist coun-
tries. The Third World - and therefore the vast
majority of the poor - has little influence. The
WTO has come to wield authority over national
governments. Multinational corporations are
unconstrained by national boundaries, and virtu-
ally unaccountable to anyone but their sharehold-
ers. There are no mechanisms for 'making ethical
standards and human rights binding for corpora-
tions and individuals, not just governments'
(UNDP 1999).
In the era of globalisation, African states are increas-
ingly losing the authority to determine both the
direction and content of social policy. Externally
imposed constraints on social policy tax conces-
sions on profits, price liberalisation, and the dis-
mantling of state-owned enterprises have all
contributed to widening inequalities. Faced with
the growing dominance of the multinational corpo-
ration in the domestic economy there remain few
legitimate ways for the indigenous capitalist class to
accumulate. Their choices are limited to becoming
agents ('compradors') of the multinationals or
crime. As UNDP points out, criminals are 'reaping
the benefits of globalisation.' At the root of all of this
'is the growing influence of organized crime, esti-
mated to gross $1.5 trillion a year, rivalling multi-
national corporations as an economic power'
(UNDP 1999: 5). The impoverishment of Africa,
and the devastating reductions in social expendi-
ture, are thus not a function of an absolute lack of
wealth, but a consequence of the use to which it has
been put.
7 What of the Future?
Are African states becoming caretakers of the
peripheral bantustans of the 'global village'? Is the
role of the state to be the maintenance of the social
order in the interests of those minorities who bene-
fit from globalisation? Are we to see a return to the
colonial paradigm in which social services for the
majority will be delivered on the basis of favour or
charity, and then only as a minimum sufficient to
serve the needs of the new global order? Are signif-
icant health resources to be provided only where
epidemics threaten to spread? Is technological inno-
vation is to be supported only if it improves the effi-
ciency of the bantustans?
There appears to be a logic to the current system
that, unless it is interrupted, may well lead to an
affirmative response to each of these questions.
Important recent developments could yet prevent
that process leading to its logical conclusion, and
reassert the primacy of justice and human rights.
The most important of these has been the resur-
gence of popular grassroots organisations that have
enabled people to organise in defence of their rights
against frequently despotic and unaccountable
structures of the state (Human Rights Monitoring
Group 2000). These formations - reminiscent of
the independence movement - perceive rights not
as legal rights, and not as charity from above, but as
a 'standard-bearer' around which people organise, a
means of struggle from below (Shivji 1989).
Much social policy research on Africa today is built
on the assumption that the major challenge lies
with the development of effective policies in a con-
text of limited funds, and weak institutional and
human resource capacities. Adjustment, slow
growth, and persistent poverty prompt governments
Notes
This also broadly defines the conditions in South
Africa under apartheid, and increasingly those in
Africa in the era of globalisation.
See, for example, World Bank (1989). This view has
been brilliantly challenged by Amartya Sen (1999)
who demonstrates that dramatic improvements in
life expectancy and reductions in child mortality
rates are an outcome of state interventions in the
social sector rather than of increases in GNP
In South Africa, similar forms of organisation were
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to re-examine social policies and safety nets. The
research challenge identified is to deal with the
'unintended effects' in relation to coverage, equity
and efficiency for vulnerable groups (IDRC 1997;
WHO 2000), taking for granted the validity of the
basic assumptions of the 'Washington Consensus'.
But are privatisation, targeting and cost-sharing the
only choices for social policy? Have they not been
proposed ad nauseam by the World Bank and others
for two decades, and resulted - without exception -
in widening social disparities? For those who, like
the Bank, have a vested interest in ensuring that
structural adjustment policies are accepted with the
minimum of opposition, there is clearly an interest
in undertaking research to ensure that any 'unin-
tended effects' are minimised But as the recent
UNDP report puts it:
Competitive markets may be the best guarantee
of efficiency, but not necessarily of equity
Liberalization and privatization can be a step to
competitive markets - but not a guarantee of
them. And markets are neither the first nor the
last word in human development. Many activi-
ties and goods that are critical to human devel-
opment are provided outside the market - but
these are being squeezed by the pressures on
public goods, a time squeeze on the environ-
ment ... When the market goes too far in dom-
inating social and political outcomes, the
opportunities and rewards of globalisation
spread unequally and inequitably - concentrat-
ing power and wealth in a select group of peo-
ple, nations and corporations, marginalizing the
others. ... When the profit motives of market
players get out of hand, they challenge people's
ethics - and sacrifice respect for justice and
human rights.(UNDP 1999: 2)
seen during the same period until the movement
was brutally crushed, only to re-emerge in other
forms in the late 1970s. The processes that took
place in South Africa in the lead up to the first
elections and the gradual transformation of the
struggle for rights into the realm of 'development'
has uncanny similarities to what happened in the
rest of the continent.
The parallels between this enthusiasm for social
investment by the state in the immediate post-
independence period and in the period immediately
after the downfall of apartheid seems to suggest that
the advanced capitalist countries are motivated by
political considerations as much as commitment to
economic dogma.
Cowen and Shenton (1996) provide a lucid analysis
of the origin of the term development', tracing its
roots to the present day orthodoxy where trusteeship
(and paternalism) continue to be at its heart.
Cornia et al. (1987). There is a wonderful irony in the
fact that as globalisation has been found to have even
more devastating effects, calls are being made for
Globalisation with a Human Face' (see UNDP 1999).
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